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B
ackground to the debate: Placebos are used in trials to 
conceal whether a treatment is being given or not and 
hence to control for the psychosomatic effects of offering 
treatment. Placebo-controlled trials are controversial. Critics 
of such trials argue that if a proven effective therapy exists, 
a placebo should not be used. But proponents argue that 
placebo trials are still crucial to prove the efﬁ  cacy and safety 
of many treatments. 
Andreas Stang, Hans-Werner Hense, and Karl-
Heinz Jöckel’s Viewpoint: It Is Unethical When a 
Beneﬁ  cial Standard Treatment Exists
A better understanding of the aetiology and pathological 
mechanisms of diseases often results in new ideas for their 
treatment. It is then necessary to put these ideas to a formal 
empirical test in a trial setting. The randomized controlled 
trial (RCT) is the closest that clinical research can get to the 
experimental situation. In the RCT, patients are assigned 
at random to an intervention of putative effectiveness, with 
the aim of minimizing the potential for bias inherent in 
nonrandomized clinical research settings. The triumphal 
advance of RCTs is reﬂ  ected in their prominent role as one of 
the pillars of evidence-based medicine.
Initially, when there is uncertainty about the efﬁ  cacy of a 
new treatment, clinical researchers are advised to compare 
the experimental intervention with a placebo. Placebo-
controlled trials serve to show that a speciﬁ  c treatment 
has a beneﬁ  cial effect on deﬁ  ned clinical endpoints 
beyond that attributable to mere administration of the 
intervention by medical professionals. Thus, the early trials 
of antihypertensive medications and statins were placebo-
controlled and were considered to be proof of their beneﬁ  cial 
effects. 
But what about the next phase? What happens when a 
treatment for a certain condition, such as hypertension, has 
been shown to be effective in placebo-controlled RCTs but a 
newer intervention has been developed for that condition? 
Let us assume that there is evidence from basic and early 
clinical trials that the new intervention has a biological effect 
and has no major side effects in appropriate doses. Should 
the researchers test it against placebo to prove the superiority 
of the new treatment? 
It is arguably unethical to withhold a therapy of proven 
efﬁ  cacy from any patient in a research trial just for the 
purpose of increasing scientiﬁ  c knowledge. Paragraph 29 
of the Declaration of Helsinki states: “The beneﬁ  ts, risks, 
burdens and effectiveness of a new method should be tested 
against those of the best current prophylactic, diagnostic, 
and therapeutic methods” [1]. A note of clariﬁ  cation for 
paragraph 29 states: “The World Medical Association hereby 
reafﬁ  rms its position that extreme care must be taken in 
making use of a placebo-controlled trial and that in general 
this methodology should only be used in the absence of 
existing proven therapy” [1].
Rothman and Michels have argued that the declaration 
should include speciﬁ  c examples showing how placebo trials 
are unethical: “It might suggest as one such example that 
even in studies of new analgesics to study relief from pain 
such as headache, the new remedies should be compared 
only with existing analgesics, and never with placebo. The 
example will reinforce the point that this principle is not a 
blurry boundary” [2].
Critics of the declaration argue that forbidding placebo 
trials puts the manufacturers of a new treatment at a scientiﬁ  c 
and commercial disadvantage. The manufacturers of a new 
treatment, say the critics, have to prove that their treatment is 
as good as an existing one, whereas the manufacturers of the 
existing treatment had to pass a “lesser test” (superiority over 
placebo) to get their drug on the market. 
For practitioners, though, the crucial question in evaluating 
a new treatment is how it compares with the standard 
available treatment, and not whether it is better than placebo. 
So the important issue is to decide when it is that we can 
call a therapy “standard”—that is, when can we speak of an 
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indisputable beneﬁ  t that would make a currently available 
treatment’s use in a trial control group ethically imperative? 
Clinical guidelines or recommendations based on high-
quality evidence sometimes exist to support use of such a 
therapy. In situations where no such guidance exists, it is 
important to assess both the beneﬁ  ts of the therapy (for 
example, in terms of survival, and relative and absolute 
risk reduction) and possible harms (including side effects, 
impaired quality of life, and economic costs). There may be 
therapies that prolong survival (there is a “gross beneﬁ  t”) 
but that cannot be considered to be beneﬁ  cial because 
the adverse effects cancel out any survival beneﬁ  t (there 
is no “net beneﬁ  t”). Such therapies cannot be considered 
“standard” treatment. 
One framework for grading the quality of evidence and 
strength of recommendations on any treatment was published 
last year by the GRADE working group [3]. The framework 
stresses the need for judgments based on a formally 
structured consideration of the balance between beneﬁ  ts and 
harm, the quality of the evidence, translation of the evidence 
in speciﬁ  c clinical situations or settings, and the certainty of 
baseline risks, including resource utilisation.
So when is use of a placebo trial unethical? It is unethical if, 
in accordance with an assessment similar to the one suggested 
by the GRADE working group (that is, balancing gross 
and net beneﬁ  ts in a given trial through a transparent and 
formalised process), therapies other than the experimental 
one are judged to be beneﬁ  cial and are available. In the many 
situations where such a decision is not clear-cut, the use of 
placebo may be considered ethically appropriate. 
Erick Turner and Martin Tramèr’s Viewpoint: 
It Can Be Unethical Not to Use Placebo
It is generally agreed that placebo is unethical when its use 
is likely to result in irreversible harm, death, or other serious 
morbidity. A common argument against placebo is that its 
use is unnecessary, and therefore unethical, when “proven 
effective therapy” exists, in which case any new treatment 
should be tested against this existing treatment. The 
argument is that if a study drug appears to perform at least as 
well as a drug that has already been “proven effective”, then 
the study drug must be effective as well. 
The problem with this reasoning is that drug efﬁ  cacy is not 
a simple all-or-none matter. If a drug with historical evidence 
of efﬁ  cacy could be relied upon to be unfailingly effective—
and placebo unfailingly ineffective—in all future clinical 
trials, we would readily admit that placebo is unnecessary and 
therefore unethical. 
The reality is that “proven effective therapy”—better called 
“assumed effective therapy” (AET)—often fails to show 
superiority to placebo. This is not because these drugs are in 
fact ineffective, but because the trials in question lack assay 
sensitivity [4,5]. Assay sensitivity is deﬁ  ned as the ability of a 
trial to distinguish an effective from an ineffective therapy.
Unfortunately, the extent of this problem is poorly 
appreciated because of publication bias: the tendency for 
studies that are positive to be published and the tendency 
of negative and indeterminate studies never to see the light 
of day [6]. Thus, the myth of infallible “proven therapy” 
is sustained. But, like a mirage, it vanishes on closer 
examination.
Khan et al. gained access to unpublished, as well as 
published, clinical trials data on antidepressants from the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) via the United States 
Freedom of Information Act [7]. They obtained the FDA 
review documents on 51 clinical trials on nine antidepressants 
approved between 1985 and 2000. Of 92 active treatment 
arms (all involving doses that were eventually approved), 47 
(51%) failed to demonstrate statistical superiority to placebo. 
Of these, there were seven cases (15%) in which the placebo 
arm was actually superior to AET. Thus, it can be seen that 
the phrase “proven effective therapy” should be taken with a 
grain of salt.
Now, what if the FDA had not had the beneﬁ  t of looking 
at the placebo arms and relied on an equivalence or 
noninferiority design [8] comparing study drug with AET? 
Khan et al. list 12 ﬂ  exible-dose studies in which (now-
approved) study drug outperformed AET (previously 
approved antidepressants) [7]. Many opponents of placebo 
would argue that each of these 12 trials provides ample 
evidence for efﬁ  cacy of the study drug. However, because 
these trials did include placebo arms, we discover that in four 
of them (33%), neither AET nor study drug beat placebo. (In 
fact, in two of these four trials, AET was numerically inferior 
to placebo.) Therefore, in these four antidepressant trials, 
the two “active” drugs were not equally effective, but rather 
equally ineffective. This critical distinction would have been 
lost without placebo, and it would have been impossible to 
ascertain that these seemingly positive trials were in fact false 
positive trials.
The problem of assay sensitivity is not conﬁ  ned to 
antidepressants or even to psychotropic drugs in general. A 
meta-analysis by Tramèr et al found that, among 52 possible 
comparisons between the “proven” antiemetic ondansetron 
and placebo, 19 (37%) failed to show a difference [5]. 
Additionally, many drug classes have shown problems 
with assay sensitivity (Box 1). The potential for reaching 
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erroneous conclusions by omitting placebo also exists outside 
of drug studies, as in the example regarding the usefulness 
of prophylactic respiratory physical therapy on pulmonary 
function after cardiac surgery [9]; in this speciﬁ  c case, the 
placebo would be a no intervention control.
If we were to rely on equivalence or noninferiority designs 
in studying drugs for indications for which assay sensitivity 
cannot be assumed, we would risk approving ineffective 
drugs. It is conceivable that even placebo itself could be 
approved under such conditions. 
According to the Declaration of Helsinki, “Medical 
research is only justiﬁ  ed if there is a reasonable likelihood 
that the populations in which the research is carried out 
stand to beneﬁ  t from the results of the research” [1]. To 
approve ineffective drugs based on ﬂ  awed science and to let 
them loose on an unsuspecting public would be unethical. 
This is akin to the phenomenon of hypercorrection, in which, 
in trying very hard to be grammatically correct, the person 
ends up being grammatically incorrect [10]. In this case, by 
trying very hard to be ethical and adhering too rigidly to the 
anti-placebo dogma, one can end up being unethical. 
In order to best serve the public health, we must ensure 
that our clinical drug trials yield scientiﬁ  cally valid results. 
Where assay sensitivity can be guaranteed, equivalence 
or noninferiority trials omitting placebo may be ethically 
preferable. However, where assay sensitivity cannot be 
guaranteed—and this problem is probably more widespread 
than we yet realize—difference-showing superiority studies, 
usually involving placebo, either as monotherapy or add-on 
therapy, are ethically preferable. 
Stang, Hense, and Jöckel’s Response to Turner 
and Tramèr’s Viewpoint
There is some common agreement between Turner 
and Tramèr’s viewpoint and ours—we agree that it is 
unethical to use placebo when a proven effective therapy 
exists. However, we question their very narrow deﬁ  nition of 
“proven effective therapy”. In their deﬁ  nition, a placebo is 
unethical when the proven effective therapy “could be relied 
upon to be unfailingly effective—and placebo unfailingly 
ineffective—in all future clinical trials”. It is possible to argue 
that all empirical evidence or knowledge is temporary and 
uncertain. Replication carries no implication for validity 
[11]. Corroborated hypotheses—in this case, about the 
effectiveness of a drug—merely “survive” and the degree of 
corroboration depends on the number and “severity” of tests 
the hypothesis has survived [12]. 
We are therefore left with the difﬁ  cult task of having to 
evaluate the current evidence of the effectiveness of available 
treatments in order to decide whether placebo is ethical or 
not. In other words, we have to make some evaluation on 
what constitutes “proven effective therapy” based on our 
current knowledge. The evaluation of current evidence 
cannot protect us against misinterpretations in the light of 
future evidence.
It appears to us that Turner and Tramèr think that 
superiority of a new drug to a control drug could only 
be established if all trials consistently show a statistically 
signiﬁ  cant superiority of the new drug over the control. But 
studies that evaluate the effectiveness of a new drug may 
not show identical results for several reasons. Features of 
the study design, including sample size, dosage, patients’ 
inclusion and exclusion criteria, choice of active control 
treatment, quality of study conduct, patients’ compliance, and 
other factors can all have an inﬂ  uence on the trial results. 
Therefore, the proportion of trials showing statistically 
signiﬁ  cant superiority (bullet counting) is an inappropriate 
indicator of drug superiority and a proportion less than 
100% is no indicator of lack of superiority. Several analytical 
techniques, including meta-analysis and meta-regression, that 
account for design features are available and provide better 
insights into the superiority of drugs than bullet counting. 
Turner and Tramèr’s Response to Stang, Hense, 
and Jöckel’s Viewpoint
Stang and colleagues quote from part of a clariﬁ  cation to 
the Declaration of Helsinki. But the clariﬁ  cation continues: 
“a placebo-controlled trial may be ethically acceptable, 
even if proven therapy is available…where for compelling 
and scientiﬁ  cally sound methodological reasons its use is 
necessary to determine the efﬁ  cacy or safety of a prophylactic, 
diagnostic or therapeutic method” [1]. Our viewpoint was 
essentially an evidence-based discussion of this clariﬁ  cation 
and its ethical implications. Assuming that medical research 
successfully rids itself of publication bias [13,14], it should 
become increasingly obvious that, for many drug classes (Box 
1), the emperor of “proven therapy” is wearing no clothes 
[15].
But this debate is not only about efﬁ  cacy; it is also about 
harm. In the absence of a placebo group, it may be impossible 
to interpret a drug’s potential for harm. Let us look at 
Stang and colleagues’ example of analgesics. The Vioxx 
Gastrointestinal Outcomes Research (VIGOR) trial showed a 
ﬁ  ve-fold difference in the incidence of myocardial infarction 
in the rofecoxib (Vioxx) group compared with the naproxen 
group [16]. 
Nonsteroidal anti-inﬂ  ammatory drugs such as naproxen, 
however, inhibit platelet function and therefore might have a 
myocardial protective effect [17]. Since the VIGOR trial did 
not include a placebo group, it remained unclear whether 
there was an increased risk of myocardial infarction with 
rofecoxib or a decreased risk with naproxen. Four years 
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Box 1. Drug Classes That Have Shown Problems 
with Assay Sensitivity
• Analgesics
• Antiemetics
• Anxiolytics
• Antihypertensives
• Hypnotics
• Antianginal  agents
•  Angiotensin-converting enzyme inhibitors for heart failure 
•  Beta-blockers given after myocardial infarction
• Antihistamines
•  Nonsteroidal asthma prophylaxis
•  Motility-modifying drugs for gastroesophageal reﬂ  ux diseasePLoS Medicine  |  www.plosmedicine.org 0180
later, and after tens of millions of patients had received 
rofecoxib [18], Merck announced they were withdrawing the 
drug because of an increased cardiovascular risk [19]. The 
decision was based on the unpublished Adenomatous Polyp 
Prevention on Vioxx (APPROVe) study, a placebo-controlled 
three-year trial of rofecoxib.
In his November 2004 testimony before the United States 
Senate, David Graham of the FDA provided an estimate of 
the rate of excess cases of Vioxx-related myocardial infarction 
and sudden cardiac death. He testiﬁ  ed that it was as if, for the 
ﬁ  ve years that Vioxx was on the United States market, “2 to 4 
jumbo jetliners were dropping from the sky every week” [20]. 
Of those cases, he added, 30% to 40% probably died.
If those who believe that “proven therapy” trials are 
ethically preferable to placebo-controlled trials had had their 
way, the APPROVe study would have been blocked, and Vioxx 
would still be on the market today. It seems ironic that such a 
stance could be taken in the name of ethics.
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